The argument from analogy is examined from the point of view of Carnap's confirmation theory. It is argued that if inductive arguments arc to be applicable to the real world, they must contain elementary analogical inferences. Carnap's system as originally developed (the A-system) is not strong enough to take account of analogical arguments, but it is shown that the new system, which he has announced but rnot published in detail (the ?-system), is capable of satisfying the conditions of inductive analogy. Finally it is shown that an elemen-cary analysis of analogical inference yielcls postulates of the ?-system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions.
Recent work in the philosophy of science has laid stress on the function of models in the structure and development of theories, and has interpreted the relation b-t ween a theoretical model and the world as that o£ analogy.l If thc use of models is regarded as a xnei-e crutch to aid the imagination in construction of theories, it may not raise any deep philosophical problems, and may be more appropriately regardcd as a study for the psychology or sociology of scieiltific discovery rather than for philosophy and logic. But if stror?ger claims are made for models, namely that an analogy with a more hr~iiiiar domain of phe~lome~la in a new donain, can provide v~tiona~p~edic~iorzs then thc logic of such claims must ini-olve what has traditionally been cal!ed the "argurnerjt from analogy".
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r ncse co?~sidcrationrs provide the motive for a fresh e::anlinaton of the argument from axlalogy in the context of modern forrriulations of inductive method. Writers on probabilistic induction including Keynes, Broacl, and T:on Wright2 bare explicitly considered this argument to be a species of induction, but have deelt with it within their respective inductive theories by means of somewhat cumbersome and ad hoc postu2ater; (for example Keynes' "generators") which aEo:--d little scope for simpliiieation or generalization. Writers on induction whose main illspiration comes from statisj:ical theory, on the other hand, practically ignore the argument lrom analogy, presuma:)iy because, as will appear bclo~v, an argument which depends upon similarities between individuals as \$-ell as upon ide~ztitiesrecltaires considerably stranger assrrrn~tio~ns than those of most applications of statistical method. Only Carnap's corlfirmatjon theory appears to be suficiently general and sufFiciently detailed to give some hope of dealing with this problem. In this paper, therefore, I shall use the techniques of Carnap's theory to elucidate the conditions of the argument from analogy, and I shall show in particular that his new axiom-system for c-functions" is capable of development as a satisfactory explication of the argument, and also that his omin choice of c-function within that system can be introduced with a minimum of arbitrary and ad hoc assumptions if the characteristics of analogy are kept in mind.
I , Ataabgy in Carnap's A-system. In Appendix D to LFP Carnap defines the inference by analogy as follows: "The evidence known to us is the fact that individuals b and c agree in certain properties and, in addition, that b has a further property; thereupon we consider the hypothesis that c too has this property" (p. 569). In terms of this definition he shons that the evidence increases the value of the c-function c* for the hypothesis above its initial value on tautological evidence, and this result can easily be extended to the A-continuum of c-functions defined in CI:l.l. If we take, for example, a language containing two primitive predicates 'I>,' and 'Pa), and two individuals a and b, we have (by CIM 5-6 and 10-7):
which is greater than the initial value, 4,of c(P2b) on tautological evidence. We also have Hence the evidence of similarity between a and b in respect of 'Plyincreases the confirmation of 'P,b' except in the case of the 'straight rule', X -0.
I t has, however, been pointed outqhat this type of argument is not what has been traditionally understood by argument from analogy, since analogical inference has always supposed dzpere?zces as well as similarities between the two analogues. Furthermore, it can be argued that if any theory of confirmation is to have application to the real world, it must provide a justification in terms of degree of confirmation for analogy arguments of this type as well as for those described by Carnap. For consider the concept of the 'next instance' or of 'all instances of a given kind' in an inductive inference. In general, what we recognize to be such instances in applications of induction, are already known not to be identical in all respects. That is to say the assumption, made in Carnap's type of inference, that the evidence ascribes to the individuals only the same property PI in both cases, and that there are not initially known to be any differences between them, is at best an idealization of the real situation. It will generally be the case that, if the total evidence is taken into account, superficially similar instances will be found to be different in some respects. Now two kinds of reasons might be advanced for ignoring such differences and treating the instances for the purposes of the induction as so far identical. First we may have reason to believe that the differences are of a kind which is causally irrelevant to the induction. But this presupposes that we have already accepted a causal law determining what is and is not relevant, and acceptance of such a law must itself rest, at least in part, upon previous decisions to ignore differences among instances which were otherwise identical, either in the case of instances of the law itself, or of instances of other laws which are taken to justify acceptance of this law in the context of a hypotheticodeductive theory. Secondly, we might decide to ignore differences between instances, either when they appear small compared with similarities, or when there are many instances of correlation of the similar properties with the problematic property in instances which are otherwise different. That is to say, we might feel justified in ignoring differences in these two cases:
(a) a has properties .P,.P,... P,P,; b has properties PIP,...P,-,P, (where 'E',' denotes the property not-P,); and the hypothesis is 'P,bY; or (b) a, has properties PIP,-,P,;-a, has properties P2P,-,P,; ... a, has properties P,P,-,P,; b has properties P, ... P,P,_,; and the hypothesis is 'P,bY.
But what is the justification for such procedures? I t might be suggested that the justification is a higher-level induction concerning a large number of cases of types (a) and (b), where we have found that ignoring the property P, in type (a), and the properties P, ... P, in type (b), has resulted in successful predictions. This suggestion, however, begs the question, because different cascs of types (a) and (b) respectively are themselves not identical in all respects, and so the higher-level induction makes just the assumption we set out to justify.
I t seems therefore that we must seek to provide a justification for arguments of types (a) and (b) within a theory of confirmation if we wish the theory to apply to practical forms of inductive argument. Xow it is clear that a necessary condition for such a justification is that the hypothesis 'P,b' should have a confirmation in both cases greater than the initial confirmation (4on tautological evidence). I t can, however, be shown that none of the inductive methods of Carnap's h-system satisfy this condition
In the paper referred to above, Achinstein has proved in general that the confirmation of the hypothesis 'If an individual b has some properties in common with another individual a and some properties different from a, then it has property P, '
is the same whichever of the following three types of evidence is adduced:
(i) a has property P, and also many properties in common with the known properties of b, and a few different;
(ii) a has property P, and few properties in common with the known properties of b, and many different;
(iii) a has property p, and few properties in common with the known properties of b, and many different.
Achinstein does not point out, however, that the confirmation of the more relevant hypothesis 'P,.bY, given any one of the same three types of evidence, is equal to the initial confirmation of the hypothesis 'P,bY. Achinstein's proof concerns the confirmation of the hypothesis ' R b 3 P,bY, where '2' denotes the known properties of b. from this theorem that neither of the analogical arguments (a) and (b) are justifiable within Carnap's A-system. This means that a large nu-mber of similarities between instances as in (a), and a large number of occurrences of the same correlation in o~herwise different instances as irj (b), both fail to give increasing confirmation as these nrambcrs respecti~iely increase, although such arguments are usually regardcd as justified and are frequentiy resorted to. Worse stil!, the result means that, far from approaching the confirmation of the inductive arguments obtained by ignoring thc propertics P,in (a) and P,... P, in (b) , the confirmation in these cases has a value just equal to the initial confirn~ation; in other words no process of learning from a.nalogous instances is justifiable. This is a very serious Limitation on the treatment of i n d u c t i~~i
Conditions for analogica1 inference, It follo~i~s
iii the A-systcrn, since if our previous remarks about the nature of practical appiicntions of induction arc accepted, it mezns that any application of thc thcory rests on an arbitrary decision to ignore part of the evidence. Such a decisio~not oniy conflicts with Carnap's requirement of total evidence (LFP 11. 2111, i :ut a!sc has I-ile consequence that the confirmation values obtained cannot bc regardcd as approximations, corrigible by a deeper level of analysis u-hich d~e stake into accouat differences Set%\-eeil instanczs, bccarrse if such analysis were carried out, all confirmations would be red~~ced ie their initial values irrespective of the evidence.
%Te must therefore require of any confirmation ~Aeory satisf~,ctinn of the fc,llon.ing condition:
I. If two individuals a and /, are knowil to agree in certain properties and differ in others, and if in addition a has a further property, then the confirmatio~i of the hypothesis that O also has this property is greater than its initia.1 confirmation; at least if the weight of thc similarities i:; sui1icicnil.y grcat con~pared with the weight of the diflerences.
This condition is still not su5ciently strong to deal with ifi~chinstein's examples, however, so let us consider what other demands might reasonably be made of analogical arguments.
I t might be demanded that, if iM1,&I2 are two Iogically independent molecular predicates each independent of the primitive predicate PJ,then
that is, that differences between instances should be irrelevant to the confirmation. Such a demand, would, however, be quite implausible, since it is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of differences between a and b reduces the confirmation of 'P3b' compared with c(P3b,MP3a. M,b). What may reasonably be demanded, however, are the two following conditions:
11. c(P3b, fl1M,P,a . MlM2b) increases or decreases with increase or decrease of the weight of M, compared with the weight of MI; Satisfaction of conditions 1-111would ensure reasonable confirmation values for the cases (a) and (b) above, and also for the examples of analogy arguments adduced by Achinstein, namely prediction of a new property H of the metal rhodium on the basis of the following kinds of evidence: (i) A very similar metal platinum has property H ; (ii) A quite dissimilar substance, say oxygen, has H ; (iii) A quite dissimilar substance which has not H.
A confirmation function satisfying conditions 1-111would give greater confirmation with evidence (i) than with (ii), and greater confirmation with (ii) than with (iii).
A function satisfying I alone would not be suficient to ensure this, although it would, unlike Carnap's A-system, show that evidence of (i), and perhaps (ii), is better than no evidence at all. In the previous discussion referred to above6 I suggested general reasons why it might be necessary to forego satisfaction of conditions I1 and 111, remaining content with a justification of analogy arguments on the basis of I only.
But it now appears that Carnap's own modification of his A-system, introduced partly for other reasons, is sufficient to satisfy all three conditions7--a much more satisfactory state of affairs; for a confirmation theory could hardly be regarded as an adequate
explication of induction if it did not deal with examples of Achinstein's types (i)-(iii).
3. Carnap's ?-system. In Appendix B of Garnap and Stegmiiller's Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit, a new axiom system for c-functions is presented, whose main object is to extend the system of CIM to deal with languages whose primitive predicates belong to families. Thus, a primitive predicate 'P,' is not alternative to just one primitive predicate 'IS,', as in the A-system, but is one of a set of predicates of equal initial weight, say 'PI,' ... ' PI,' , comprising the family %,' . Axioms NA 1-15 repeat the axioms of CIM for regular symmetric c-functions (C 1-7), introduce the notion of predicate-families, and modify and extend the other C-axioms to account for languages containing such families. In particular the previous axiom C 8, which stated that c-functions are symmetrical with respect to Q-predicates in the CIM system (which are the conjunctions of every primitive predicate of the language, either negated or unnegated), is replaced by NA 8 and 9, which state symmetry only with respect to primitive predicates, and with respect to families having equal numbers of primitive predicates. Since C 8 is sufficient to ensure that any c-function of the A-system violates the analogy conditions 1-111, and N A 8 and 9 are not strong enough to violate them, it is possible to look for a c-function or c-functions satisfying both NA 1-15 and conditions 1-111. 
91.mHESSE
The form of c-function is not uniquely determined by NA 1-15, and Carnap and Stegrniiller proceed (ILW p. 251) For the first suggested definition, the whole set of Q-predicates of Fl and F2 (the set of conjunctions of one predicate from F, and one predicate from F2)is regarded as a "pseudo-family". The m-values arc then equivalent to those in the A-system for a language whose set of Q-predicates is the set of Q-predicates of F, and F,. Thus, denoting uz-values according to the definition by '~n~~,~' , in the case of two families containing k, and k, predicates respectively and hence yielding k,k, Q-predicates, the values of are the same as those in the A-system for a language of k,k,
-0-predicates.
Carnap next proposes to test these two suggested definitions by means of three simple examples for a language with k, = k, = 2. Simplifying still further by considering only four individuals w, x, y, z , the examples are essentially as follows. Consider the state descriptions: P1P,7u . P,P,x . p1pzy. PlP2z ( C ) P,P,w . P,P,x . P,P,y . P,P,z.
We should expect (a) m(A)< nz(B), since, for example, we want and we should expect (b) 112(B) < m(C), since we want Now ma1!' satisfies (b) but not (a), and mA1,2 satisfies (a) but not (b). Therefore Carnap suggests a third solution which is a weighted mean of these, and satisfies both conditions, namely ma,, (e) = df T ?nr1l2 (e) 4-(1 -T) mj!'2 (el (3.1) urhere 0 < q < 1. Thus if the parameter 7 is nearer to 1, weight is given to the similarities of Q-predicates appealed to in requirement (b), and if q is near to zero, weight is given to the identities of Q-predicates appealed to in (a), but no weight to their similarities.
This introduction of the function mn,,,(e) appears somewhat arbitrary and ad hoc, and is not further developed by Carnap here. Neither is any generalization given for more than two families although Carnap states that he and Kemeny are working on one. If, however, we take the simplest generalization of the same form consistent with N A 1-15, we obtain for n families, with an obvious notation, m~,,, (e) = ,,?l?n212',,.'n -(3.2) (e) -1 (I 7 )mz,1,2,. ,.n (4. I t will now be shown, in the case of three families, that m?.,,,(e) thus defined satisfies conditions 1-111.
Let us take a language of three families containing respectively the predicates CPI,)
; C P 9 cp 9 < pY 3 .
(pljl) , , , ,, Hence conditions 1-111are satisfied by the m-function (3.2) for a language of three families containing two predicates each. The proof can be extended immediately to show that the same functions c,, c,, cl, co satisfy conditions 1-111 in a language containing n families, by using N A 11, which states that c(h, e) is independent of families other than those occurring in h and e. The proof is also independent of the number of individuals in the language, by N A 10. I t should be noticed that for 7 = 1, that is m~,, (e) = m$1213 (e), the m-values do not satisfy the condition m2/m, > rnl/sn,, that is, the simple generalization (3.2) of Carnap's suggested definition does not conform to condition I1 for analogy arguments, although it does satisfy conditions I and 111, and in fact gives c-values equivalent to those obtained by restricting the evidence to 'P,a7, and ignoring other similarities and differences between a and 6. Carnap's new "Axiom of Analogy" 1VA 16 is satisfied by m1/21.-lgl (e); it therefore follows that the axiom-system N A 1-16 is not suscient for conditions 1-111, nor, incidentally, as Carnap implicitly recognizes, is it suecient to deal with Carnap's own example (a) described above. A further axiom is required to eliminate the possibility 7 = 1.
A derivationof m~, (e).
We have seen that at least one generalization of Carnap's 7-system satisfies conditions 1-111 for arguments involving three two-predicate families. Let us now try to make she form of m~, , (e) for two families a little more luminous by relating it to general considerations regarding induction and analogy. The fundamental inductive argument has always been conceived on the model of the drawings of balls out of bais; an artificial si&ation where it is natural to suppose that for purposes of generalization and prediction some of the balls are identical with each other. This, I have already argued, is not a situation found in nature, and it is not surprising that, with this ~t a r i i n~-~o i n t , the more realistic situation of similar but not identical instances cannot be adequately represented in confirmation-theory without the special introduction of ad hoc assumptions. Let us therefore suppose that the fundamental inductive argument that needs explication is not the inference of 'Plby from 'P1a,' but the inference of 'P2bY from 'PlP2a . Plby. The demand that this inference shall have confirmation greater than 4 is stronger than condition I, since the evidence here contains no known similarity between a and b, but it turns out that no weaker demand can be satisfied without violating other requirements for the c-functions. Suppose we now analyse this elementary analogical inference into two idealized situations in which the evidence is denoted by, respectively, 'P2ay and 'Pla . Plb', and treat these situations according to Carnap's A-system. As before we assume only two individuals, and initially we consider a language with two families of predicates 'P,', 'p,' and 'P,', 'pi. T o be an adequate representation of the elementary analogical inference the confirmation function c(P2b, PlP2a .P,b)
.4NAI,OGY AKD CONFIRMATION THEORY must have a value greater than c(P,b, t ) = *, but less than c(P,b, P2a), since the evidence 'P,aY does not decide between the favorable case 'Pla. Plb' and the unfavorable case '&a. Plb' specified in the atialogical inference. Thus we should expect where ci is calculated as in the A-system, for a language of four Q-predicates.
In other words we expect the evidence 'P,a. P1by to diminish the favorability of the evidence 'P,aY. The required confirnlation function can therefore be regarded as lying between the extreme values ca(P,b. P' ,a . P1b) (which itself has value *), and cn(P,b, P2a). Let us therefore put cq(P2b, P,P2a . P,b) = cj.(P,b, P,a) + i ( 1 -7)' where 0 < 7 < 1 . (4.1)
Let us further assume that the new c-function has the same value as c?.(h, e) for h = P,b, e = I-',a, and for 12 = P,b, e = P,a, that is D4 and (4.2) give vrV(PTa. P,b) = mA112(P,.a. P,b) = 2[mn1~'(P,P,a . P,P,b) -m?'"~J~,a . P,P,b)] = 2[m,(P,P,a P,P,b) + m,,(P,P,a. PJ',b)] m,(l?,a. P,b) = nzA1s2(P,a.P,b) = 4m2l*"(P,PSa. P,P,b) = 2[mq(PTPFa . P,P,b) + m,,(P,P,a . PJ',b)] (r, s = 1 , 2 ; r #s). Hence from (4.1) Thus the function m, corresponds to Carnap's ma,, for two families.
The derivation of (4.3) from (4.1) and (4.2) can be extended at once to a language of N individuals by using NA 10, and to a language of n two-predicate families by using NA 11, irrespective of any particular generalization of (3.1) to n families. But the generalization to m(iM,a . iKb), where M,, ik?, are molecular predicates made u p of the primitive predicates of more than two families is not entailed by (4.1) and (4.2)' although the m-function (3.2) is the simplest generalization consistent with N A 1-15 and 1-111.
5. Summary. We have investigated the conditions under which a theory of confirmatiort of Carnap's type can provide an adequate explication of analogy arguments, and shown that a natural generalization of Carnap's 7-system for c-functions satisfies these conditions in the simplest non-trivial case. I t has been suggested that the primary explicatum of a confirmation theory which is to be applicable to the real world is an elementary analogical inference which takes account of differences between instances as well as similarities; and finally it has been shown that a certain analysis of this inference yields Carnap's 7-system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions.
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